Doctoral Thesis - Treating People Differently
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AbstractThe view that (wrongful) discrimination involves differential treatment on the basis of irrelevant considerations has been scarcely defended. In my thesis, I look to defend it. I develop a notion of irrelevance and use it to describe rationality's role in a conception of discrimination. I also address the worry that a focus on rationality dilutes discrimination's putative moral content. I show that an irrelevance view of discrimination allows that paradigm cases, as marked by socially salient attributes, warrant special moral concern. Two upshots. First, the resulting conception of discrimination is ecumenical with respect to moral theories. Second, the resulting conception of discrimination accounts not just for inequalities precipitated by background injustice, but ones that are new or emerging too. Detailed SummaryMy thesis proceeds in three distinct parts. In the first, I develop a formal theory of discrimination. In the second, I address lingering concerns about whether the theory proposed captures the intuitive moral character of discrimination. And in the third, I apply the proposed theory to an issue of general concern. Part One: A Theory of Discrimination In Chapter One, "Discrimination and Relevance", I describe the central aspects of the view I propose, Reasons-Discrimination. On this view, agents discriminate when they treat people differently on the basis of attributes that are insufficiently (evidentially) relevant to their legitimate goals. To motivate this way of conceiving of discrimination, I propose, precisify, and defend a notion of 'sufficient relevance'. An attribute is sufficiently relevant to a given goal when it makes a large enough difference to determine the choice that is normatively expected (for that agent, given that decision). At first glance, this view seems to exclude some paradigm cases of discrimination. However, an agent's deliberation is relevant to moral inquiry only in light of goals the agent may permissibly pursue, or legitimate goals. In Chapter Two, "The Importance of Goal-Setting", I discuss the matter of goals further. I propose one way we might operationalise the legitimate goals for use in Reasons-Discrimination. In Chapter Three, I describe why the theory presented is formal, not substantive. The extension of the resulting theory of discrimination 'shifts' depending on the theories of rationality and morality assumed. In addition, no constraints are imposed on the attributes which serve as grounds of discrimination. Part Two: Moral IssuesWith the resulting formal theory of discrimination in hand, I consider the worry that it is morally inapt. For one, it appears unable to tell between cases that differ in terms of a putatively morally relevant feature. Furthermore, the cases which would fall under this conception of discrimination would be unified by a minimal wrong that cannot be distinctive of discrimination. In Chapter Four, "Social Salience and Normativity", I demonstrate that the theory presented can be further developed to account for certain moral intuitions, even without being bolstered into a substantive theory. As an example, whether an attribute is socially salient can bear on one's expectation of the degree of wrong involved in a given case of discrimination. But to identify a genuine difference in wrongness, a notion of social salience must combine with a normative principle. I discuss one such principle to do with wrongful inequality. In Chapter Five, "Wrongs and the Value of Distinctiveness", I take a deflationary tack and argue that finding a distinctive wrong ought not be a constraint on, or desideratum of, moral inquiry. Part Three: ApplicationsIn Chapter Six, "Breaking Ties with Affirmative Action", James Bernard Willoughby and I point to the value of attending to the relationship between attributes and legitimate goals. Even on the assumption that agents ought to choose on the basis of competence when hiring for a job or admitting to a university, we argue that it can be permissible to choose who to hire or select on the basis of other considerations. When? When there are ties in competence. We argue that in the event of a tie, one ought to favour members of disenfranchised, disadvantaged, or minority groups. We also argue that ties in competence are much more common than generally supposed. We thereby offer a robust defence of affirmative action.